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Treating Fair Use as an Easement
on Intellectual Property
Copyright holders have run with the copyright-as-property analogy to
strengthen their rights, to the detriment of the public. There are few
barriers to copyright holders locking all content behind paywalls regardless of the mixed public domain nature of the content or the fair use
intentions of the public. If fair use is treated as an easement, fair use applies
even if a law doesn’t explicitly invoke it, the public’s fair use rights cannot
be eliminated, and copyright holders may be enjoined if they completely
block fair use rights. In his 2016 article “Copyright Easement,” Jason
Mazzone argues copyright easements are a way authors can reserve rights
when assigning their works to publishers, but Mazzone does not equate
fair use with an easement. Others have hinted at the possibility of fair use
as an easement, but none has developed it.
Making fair use an easement rebalances the property analogy to
strengthen the public’s interest in copyrighted works and provides a
theoretical and case-law foundation to push back against copyright
holders’ intellectual land grab. This Note is the first paper to fully advocate treating fair use as an easement on copyright.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fair use should be interpreted, using property law analogies, as
an easement to override any presumption that laws eliminate fair
use. Fair use is a property interest conveyed by § 107 of the
Copyright Act. Fair use balances the exclusive rights granted by
§ 106 but also creates rights that pervade all of copyright. In any
copyright consideration, the easement-like rights reserved to the
public must be balanced against the exclusive rights granted to
the author.
Copyright owners strengthen control over their creations by
equating copyright with property and taking advantage of the
implications of this intellectual property analogy.1 Opponents of an
intellectual land grab have fought back with the strong statutory
protections of fair use, which this Note argues work like an
easement on intellectual property.2 Copyright law incentivizes the
creation of works that will eventually belong to the public.3 Those

1. See e.g., Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735, 736 (2015) (“The
problem with intellectual property metaphors is that they obscure the welfarist justification
for intellectual property and encourage the creation of intellectual property rights inconsistent with that justification.”); Douglas Y’Barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right
Conferred by Copyright, 49 MERCER L. REV. 643, 643–44 (1998) (arguing that copyright is more
analogous to misappropriation law than to property law); Leigh Beadon, The Copyright
Lobotomy: How Intellectual Property Makes Us Pretend to Be Stupid, TECHDIRT (Apr. 23, 2013,
7:28 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130410/12051322665/copyright-lobotomy
-how-intellectual-property-makes-us-pretend-to-be-stupid.shtml (“[T]he moment there might
be any benefit to the consumer, the content companies toss the [property] analogy out the
window, and suddenly want to talk about reality.”).
2. Another strong property concept that diminishes owners’ rights is the public’s
future interest in copyrighted works. A copyright owner does not have a fee simple interest
in their work. The public owns a remainder interest following the end of the exclusive period
of copyright protection. The property concept of waste could be applied to copyright, but
that topic is not the subject of this Note.
3. See e.g., Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public Domain in
Copyright Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1869, 1870 (2011) (presented at Notre Dame School of
Law “Creativity and the Law” Symposium) (recognizing that copyright law intends to
incentivize both creation and dissemination of creative works, thereby promoting the public
interest); Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. REV.
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future public interests are the objective of copyright law. The
temporary exclusive rights offered to owners are bait, promising
more than they really offer.
Even during copyright’s temporary period of exclusivity,
copyright law benefits the public by granting exceptions to the
owners’ exclusive rights. Most notable among the exceptions is fair
use, statutorily recognized by § 107 of the Copyright Act. However,
in the absence of an easement perspective, the wording of § 107
leaves room for judges to give greater weight to other laws,
potentially ignoring fair use. The district court in Universal City
Studios v. Reimerdes exemplified this when it held that fair use
applied to copyright infringement but not to other statutorily
created actions.4
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides in critical part that
certain uses of copyrighted works that otherwise would be
wrongful are “not . . . infringement[s] of copyright.” Defendants,
however, are not here sued for copyright infringement. They are
sued for offering and providing technology designed to circumvent technological measures that control access to copyrighted
works and otherwise violating Section 1201(a)(2) of the Act. If
Congress had meant the fair use defense to apply to such actions,
it would have said so. Indeed, as the legislative history
demonstrates, the decision not to make fair use a defense to a
claim under Section 1201(a) was quite deliberate.5

If fair use were treated as an easement it would strengthen the
public’s interests. Copyright already strongly analogizes with
property law. Equating fair use with an easement rebalances
copyright conflicts. The parties are competing owners of property
interests whose rights must be balanced to maximize the usefulness of creative works.

613, 616 (2014) (presented at Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium, “Recalibrating Copyright: Continuity, Contemporary Culture, and Change”) (contending that exclusive statutory rights must be linked to encouraging creativity).
4. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
judgment entered, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
5. Id. (footnote omitted).

1075

003.KOWALLIS_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/4/19 4:36 PM

2018

Thinking of fair use as an easement is not completely novel.6
Some commentators have recognized the possible analogy between easements and fair use,7 but none has developed the idea.
Jason Mazzone’s 2016 article, titled “Copyright Easements,” analyzed the use of easements to convey copyright interests compared
to licenses or assignments but did not equate fair use with an
easement.8 According to Mazzone, one beneficial use of such
easements is reserving the right to evaluate the fair use of others
after transferring copyright.9 Reserving such a right avoids the
conflict of interest when a copyright owner evaluates fair use.10

6. This very idea appears in a copyright treatise from 1996. MAVIS FOWLER, THE LAW
COPYRIGHT 59 (1996) (“Fair Use is like an easement or a right of way through private
property for the public’s benefit.”). In addition, Timothy Brennan concludes his article
discussing fair use and the authority to exclude by comparing fair use to an easement:
Fair use is nothing more than a zero-price compulsory license of copyrighted
works for particular uses. From the perspective of the economic theory of
property, such a license seems to preempt the market forces and negotiations that
should tell us whether it is efficient to make the work available at a zero price.
However, markets and negotiations can be costly, explaining why private parties
allocate some transactions outside markets. More important in this context, these
considerations can rationalize the allocation of property rights and the existence
of “default” procedures in the law such as commercial codes, corporate organization, and bankruptcy. Such considerations can rationalize fair use as well, to the
extent that it defines uses for which transaction costs are high and the expected
negotiated price would be close to zero. An analogy to fair use in property law
might be an easement created by zoning or other property regulation.
Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 675, 712–
13 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
7. L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., Chapter 10. A Unified Theory of
Copyright, in A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 383, 388 (Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46
HOUS. L. REV. 215 (2009) (analyzing copyright law as a series of easements, including “the
copyright owner’s easement for marketing a copyrighted work, the author’s fair use
easement in creating a new work, and the user’s easement for personal use of a copyrighted
work for learning”); Brennan, supra note 6, at 712–13 (“An analogy to fair use in property law
might be an easement created by zoning or other property regulation.”); Dane S. Ciolino,
Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 73 n.195
(1997) (citing FOWLER, supra note 6, at 59) (“Fair Use is like an easement or a right of way
through private property for the public’s benefit.”); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use,
55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 249, 266 (stating that fair use is “a limited easement”
given to society “to benefit from [the author’s] creative efforts”); Ned Snow, The Forgotten
Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 157 n.122 (2011) (disputing Richard DeWolf’s
1925 copyright treatise commentary on Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F.
539 (1st Cir. 1905), by asserting that the Sampson court’s “conceived fair use was analogous
to the rights of an easement holder over a servient estate holder”).
8. Jason Mazzone, Copyright Easements, 50 AKRON L. REV. 725, 725–27 (2016).
9. Id. at 727.
10. See id. at 736. Mazzone uses as an example a filmmaker who captured in a brief
background shot some televised footage of a comedian the filmmaker thinks is fair use. Id.
OF
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Despite such tangential mentions of fair use and easements, neither
Mazzone nor other scholars have developed the analogy.
As the world digitizes more and more copyrighted content,
owners will have more control over access to and allowable uses of
content. Given the choice, content owners will likely inhibit fair use
as much as possible under the guise of preventing theft. By framing
fair use as a property interest, courts can push back on owners’
efforts to erode fair use rights. The fair use factors don’t need to
change nor does fair use case law. But application of the easement
metaphor can help courts better balance public and private rights
in copyright to maximize the utility of works incentivized by
copyright protections for authors.
Fair users exercise their statutorily granted rights in copyrighted works. Although described as an affirmative defense,11 fair
The depicted comedian is flattered to be included in the documentary even just in
the background. The network, however, owns the copyright in the footage; it
denies that fair use applies and threatens a lawsuit if the footage is used. The
filmmaker deletes the scene.
....
. . . [In this scenario,] the author’s transfer of the copyright prevents use of the
work that the author considers beneficial. . . .
....
. . . The author, with a stronger stake in exposure of the work, might be
delighted to see his or her work used by others in ways that fair use law allows.
Publishers, however, see instead opportunities to extract a licensing fee, with the
result that lawful fair uses are not made.
Id. at 736–37, 741. Reserving an easement could allow the author to determine fair uses of his
work while assigning the copyright to a publisher. Id. at 753.
11. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (“[F]air use is an
affirmative defense . . . .”) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 561 (1985)); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Fair
use traditionally has been treated as an affirmative defense to a charge of copyright
infringement.”) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590). Bateman further clarified that regardless of
how fair use is viewed, “it is clear that the burden of proving fair use is always on the
putative infringer.” Id.; see also WEST’S ALR DIGEST Copyrights and Intellectual Property
I(J)(1)(k53.2), ALRDG 99K53.2 (updated Dec. 2018) (“‘Fair use’ serves as affirmative defense
to claim of copyright infringement, and thus party claiming that its secondary use of original
copyrighted work constitutes fair use typically carries burden of proof as to all issues
in dispute.”).
Regarding the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), fair use is different than
traditional affirmative defenses because plaintiffs must consider fair use before acting.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 416
(2016), and cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2263 (2017) (“Even if, as Universal urges, fair use is classified
as an ‘affirmative defense,’ we hold—for the purposes of the DMCA—fair use is uniquely
situated in copyright law so as to be treated differently than traditional affirmative defenses.
We conclude that because 17 U.S.C. § 107 created a type of non-infringing use, fair use is
‘authorized by the law’ and a copyright holder must consider the existence of fair use before
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use is not an excused infringement but a justified noninfringement.12 A fair user should not be “excused”13 from infringing any
more than an easement user is excused for trespassing.14 In both
cases the supposed infringer is justifiably exercising their nonpossessory interest in another’s property.
In property terms, fair use is most analogous to an easement.
Fair use gives third parties rights to use another’s property for
specific purposes not subject to revocation by the property owner.
Fair use limits the rights of the owner,15 which means fair use
justifies16 noninfringement rather than excusing17 infringement.18

sending a takedown notification under § 512(c).”). For comparison, an easement is an
affirmative defense to trespass. CDC Pineville, LLC v. UDRT of N.C., LLC, 622 S.E.2d 512,
518 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“As an affirmative defense to trespass, a defendant may assert that
its entry onto plaintiff’s land ‘was lawful or under legal right.’”).
12. See Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1151–52 (“Fair use is not just excused by the law, it is wholly
authorized by the law. . . . [F]air use of a copyrighted work is permissible because it is a noninfringing use.”); Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1542 n.22 (“[F]air use should no longer be considered
an infringement to be excused; instead, it is logical to view fair use as a right.”).
13. Excuse concedes the wrongness of an act but absolves liability. Linda A. Malone,
Is There Really a Difference Between Justification and Excuse, or Did We Academics Make It Up?,
42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 321, 322–23 (2009) (“Excuse . . . began as a plea for mercy by those who
lacked the culpability to be held responsible under criminal law. . . . [E]xcuse defenses are,
on the whole, ad hoc and individual.” (footnote omitted)).
14. An easement is an affirmative defense to trespass. CDC Pineville, 622 S.E.2d at 518
(“As an affirmative defense to trespass, a defendant may assert that its entry onto plaintiff’s
land ‘was lawful or under legal right.’”).
15. See Quality King Distribs. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 136 (1998)
(“[E]xclusive right[s] . . . under section 106 . . . [are] limited right[s]. The introductory
language in § 106 expressly states that all of the exclusive rights granted by that section . . .
are limited by the provisions of §§ 107 through 120.”).
16. Justification refers to actions expected and condoned; they are not wrong. Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1899
(1984) (“[Justified] behavior is not wrongful; it is warranted.”). Society expects that a justified
action would be repeated by other persons placed in the same position. Id.
17. See Malone, supra note 13.
18. The distinction between justification and excuse alters the generality of reasoning.
Justifications have general validity while excuses only apply to individual circumstances. See
Arnold N. Enker, In Support of the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 42 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 273, 277 (2009).
A legal system that seeks to inform its citizens concerning right and wrong must
explain why a particular defendant is acquitted of the charges. Is it because what
he did was right in the circumstances, even though prima facie his conduct
violated a legal norm? Or is he acquitted notwithstanding that he did wrong,
because he has a personal excuse and the criminal law does not demand
martyrdom? The failure to distinguish between justification and excuse would
obscure the import of the law’s rules of conduct and the way in which they differ
from its rules of decision making.
Id.

1078

003.KOWALLIS_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1073

3/4/19 4:36 PM

Treating Fair Use as an Easement

Part II will address certain background principals of copyright
and property law. Part III will then discuss how treating fair use as
an easement furthers the purpose of the intellectual property
clause. Part III will first discuss why treating fair use as an easement is a good analogy. Part III will then go on to discuss how
treating fair use as an easement provides a clear framework for
courts to work in and protects fair use rights. Finally, Part III will
discuss the implication of fair use as an easement that fair use
cannot be eliminated.
II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND DOCTRINES
The Constitution authorizes,19 and the Copyright Act implements,20 incentives to create for the benefit of the public.21 Rewarding creators is not the goal but the means.22 U.S. law explicitly

19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (allowing the legislature to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
20. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (“[The Copyright Act] depends
upon . . . the authority conferred under article I, § 8, of the Federal Constitution . . . .”).
21. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
As we have explained, “[t]he economic philosophy behind the [C]opyright
[C]lause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors.” Accordingly, “copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing
that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the
public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge . . . . The profit motive
is the engine that ensures the progress of science.” Rewarding authors for their
creative labor and “promot[ing] . . . Progress” are thus complementary; as James
Madison observed, in copyright “[t]he public good fully coincides . . . with the
claims of individuals.”
Id. (citations omitted).
22. See id. at 214 (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))).
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favors a utilitarian23 basis over a moral rights24 or labor25 basis. Any
rights or benefits given to owners are tempered by the overall
objective of the copyright system to provide the public with a
greater volume and quality of publicly accessible works.26 The

23. The casebook text Copyright in a Global Information Economy describes utilitarian
and moral rights.
[C]opyright’s purpose is purely utilitarian. Copyright law exists to provide a
marketable right for the creators and distributors of copyrighted works, which in
turn creates an incentive for production and dissemination of new works. . . . [T]he
Framers of the U.S. Constitution embraced this utilitarian rationale for copyright
protection when they granted Congress the power to enact the copyright laws.
Granting a limited monopoly to the authors of creative works provided a means
for the fledgling country to encourage progress in knowledge and learning.
JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & MAUREEN A. O’ROURKE, COPYRIGHT
IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 7 (4th ed. 2015).
24. See Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 36 (2005).
Since the enactment of the Statute of Anne in 1709, the first modern copyright law,
the justification for copyright has comprised two general normative theories. The
first is utilitarianism, and the second is natural rights theory, particularly the labor
theory of property and the social contract doctrine at the core of John Locke’s
political philosophy. The labor theory of property usually is given short shrift by
modern copyright scholars, but it certainly played a justificatory role in the
historical copyright debates. As Representative Gulian Verplanck stated in
defense of a bill that became the Copyright Act of 1831: “[T]he work of an author
was the result of his own labor. It was a right of property existing before the law
of copyrights had been made.” State laws protecting intellectual property rights
prior to the 1787 Federal Convention also reflected a Lockean influence. New
Hampshire, to name but one example, enacted legislation to protect copyrights
and other forms of intellectual property because “there being no property more
peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by the labour of his mind.”
Moreover, the evolution and creation of new types of intellectual property rights
in the nineteenth century, such as trademarks and trade secrets, followed the
contours of a labor theory of property. The initial definition and protection of trade
secrets as property entitlements, for instance, derived its justification from the
courts’ belief that such rights were similar to other property rights born of valuable
labor and already protected by the law.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also COHEN, LOREN, OKEDIJI & O’ROURKE, supra note 23, at 11.
The utilitarian justification for copyright protection is not the only possible
rationale for granting exclusive rights to authors of creative works. Some argue
that such rights are morally required. The countries of Continental Europe
generally subscribe to the notion that an author’s natural right in her creation is
the principal justification for copyright protection.
Id.
25. See 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017, at 23 (2017) (“One significant difference between the natural rights
perspective and the utilitarian perspective relates to who is entitled to the fruits of productive
labor. In the natural rights framework, the inventor or author is entitled to the social benefits
produced by his or her efforts. In the utilitarian framework, reward to the inventor or author
is a secondary consideration; the principal objective is to enrich the public at large.”).
26. See supra note 21.
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temporary monopoly control by the content creator is balanced
against the public’s current fair use rights and future interests.27
The common law on real property developed over centuries
and provides a basis of comparison for the statutorily created rights
of copyright, which are commonly lumped with other concepts in
the term “intellectual property.” To appreciate these arguments
requires background information on the Copyright Act and certain
principles of property law.
A. Copyright
The first background principle is copyright law. The Copyright
Act implements the Constitution’s authorization28 to vest in
authors certain exclusive rights for a “limited” duration and subject
to exceptions benefiting the public.29 The Copyright Act creates six
exclusive rights: (1) to reproduce the work, (2) to prepare
derivative works, (3) to distribute copies of the work, (4) to perform
the work, (5) to display the work publicly, and (6) to digitally
transmit audio works.30 Copyright holders may prevent others
from exercising the holders’ exclusive rights, regardless of the
copyright holders’ choice to exercise those rights themselves.31
Fair use is one of several exceptions to a copyright holder’s
exclusive rights and was first articulated, although not named “fair
use,” by Judge Story in Folsom v. Marsh.32 Judge Story described
both the author’s and the third party’s rights as property.33 The
plaintiff in Folsom, Mr. Sparks, authored a twelve-volume

27. In real property law, future interest holders may claim “waste” when current
property possessors inflict harm on future property interests. 19 MANUEL FARACH, FLORIDA
REAL ESTATE—FLORIDA PRACTICE SERIES § 2:17 (2018 ed.). The consideration of the public’s
future interests and their rights to prevent loss or destruction of their future rights will not
be dealt with in this Note. It is a valid concern that technological protections of copyrighted
works may prevent those works from ever becoming fully accessible and part of the
public domain.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (“[The Copyright Act] depends
upon . . . the authority conferred under article I, § 8, of the Federal Constitution . . . .”).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
31. ’The right of copyright holders to exclude others exists regardless of their own
publication. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985).
Not only may authors choose when to publish, they retain the right to choose not to publish
while preserving their copyright remedies. See id.
32. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
33. Id. at 346.
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anthology of the writings and correspondence of George
Washington.34 The defendant, Reverend Charles W. Upham, subsequently produced a biography of Washington that included
extensive quotations of Washington’s letters copied from
Mr. Sparks’ work.35 In this context of publishing original letters,
Judge Story balanced the competing rights of the author, the
recipient, and third parties.36
Judge Story concluded that the letter’s author had exclusive
rights in the letter. Any attempt by a third party to publish the
letters was “not a mere breach of confidence or contract, but [would
be] a violation of the exclusive copyright of the writer.”37 Such a
publication justified an injunction by a court of equity.38
The recipient of a letter deserved limited property rights
outside the control of the letter’s author.39 In Judge Story’s words,
“the person, to whom letters are addressed, has but a limited right,
or special property, (if I may so call it), in such letters.”40 This
contrasts with the “general property” rights which “belong to
the writer.”41
Third parties, unrelated to author or recipient, “are not entitled to
publish them, to subserve their own private purposes of interest, or
curiosity, or passion.”42 With this reasoning, Judge Story concluded

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347 (“[T]he copyright act of 1831, . . . fully recognizes the doctrine for which
I contend. It gives by implication to the author, or legal proprietor of any manuscript whatever, the sole right to print and publish the same, and expressly authorizes the courts of
equity of the United States to grant injunctions to restrain the publication thereof, by any
person or persons, without his consent.”).
39. Id. at 346.
[Recipients] possess, the right to publish any letter or letters addressed to them,
upon such occasions, as require, or justify, the publication or public use of them;
but this right is strictly limited to such occasions. Thus, a person may justifiably
use and publish, in a suit at law or in equity, such letter or letters as are necessary
and proper, to establish his right to maintain the suit, or defend the same. So, if he
be aspersed or misrepresented by the writer, or accused of improper conduct, in a
public manner, he may publish such parts of such letter or letters, but no more, as
may be necessary to vindicate his character and reputation, or free him from unjust
obloquy and reproach.
Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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that Reverend Upham’s publication of Washington’s letters violated Mr. Sparks’ exclusive rights.43
The term “fair use” represents Judge Story’s equitable balancing of the legitimate needs of the public against the exclusive rights
of a copyright holder. When courts consider the infringement
asserted to be fair use, they balance the competing interests.44
Notwithstanding the exclusive rights of copyright holders, a reproduction of a protected work for a “fair use” is not an infringement
of copyright.45
Fair use was codified in 1976 by the Copyright Act.46 According to the House report on the Copyright Act, the factors codified
in § 107 were intended to “provide some gauge for balancing the
equities” of copyright holder and fair user.47
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.48

43. Id. at 349.
44. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985)

(considering “the balance of equities” in a fair use case); Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp. 753,
757 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“[C]ourts must balance the statutory factors ‘to determine whether the
public interest in the free flow of information outweighs the copyright holder’s interest in
exclusive control over the work.’” (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.,
796 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1986))).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
46. Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, on
October 19, 1976.
47. H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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B. Property
The second background principle required to understand the
easement nature of fair use is real property law. While property is
commonly thought of as ownership and control of a thing or place,
“property is best understood as a ‘bundle of rights.’”49 These
“rights” constitute the relations between the “owner” and all
others, and form the normative basis for private ownership.50 The
right to exclude others is the dominant and most well understood
of those rights.51 The common law of trespass evolved from the
right of real property owners to exclude others from their
property.52 The right to exclude is so strong it applies even when
the trespasser does not cause any harm.53
Easements are third-party property interests that limit the
exclusive rights of property owners in favor of the third-party
interest holders.54 A common example is the right to use a road
crossing another person’s land. Easements and covenants are nonpossessory property interests often referred to as “servitudes.”55
Significantly, an easement is a property interest and not merely a
creature of contract.56 Easements are limitations of the rights attached to the ownership of land, meaning their limitations transfer

49. J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711,
712 (1996).
50. Id.
51. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 721 (1917). In academic literature other enumerated rights include
liberties, claim-rights, powers, immunities, possession, use, the right to capital, the liability
to execution, the immunity from expropriation, and others. Penner, supra note 48, at 712–13.
52. 7 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 23:5 (2018). “At common
law, every person’s land was deemed to be inclosed so that every unwarrantable entry on
the land necessarily carried with it some damage for which the trespasser was liable.” Id.
Trespass emerged in the period 1250–1272. Id.
53. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997).
54. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND
§ 1:1 (2018).
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also, e.g., Magna, Inc. v. Catranis, 512 So. 2d 912, 913–14 (Ala. 1987)
(emphasizing that easement is property right); Wilson v. Johnston, 990 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1999) (“An easement is a property right and as such is entitled to all the
constitutional safeguards afforded to other property rights.”); Connole v. Babij, 59 A.3d 334,
336 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (“An easement is not a privilege, but rather is a property
interest. . . . “); H & F Land, Inc. v. Panama City–Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 736 So. 2d
1167, 1172 (Fla. 1999) (“[A]n easement is more than a mere personal privilege; it is an interest
in land.”).
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to future owners even if future owners are unaware of them.57 In
contrast, contract-based transfers can have privity issues when
rights are transferred to those not originally part of the contract.58
These fundamental principles pertaining to easements and
property law are crucial to understand why and how copyright law
should treat fair use as an easement.
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION IS BEST SERVED BY TREATING
FAIR USE AS AN EASEMENT
Treating fair use as an easement affirms the public rights and
benefits the Constitution sought to promote. Congress promoted
“the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by giving authors
temporary exclusive rights to their works.59 Amid the exclusive
rights given to authors is a reservation of rights to the public.60 Fair
use rights are one of these reserved rights for the public.
57. 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS § 60.07(a) (David A. Thomas
ed., 2017).
The very nature of an easement, and a major point justifying its existence, is
to guarantee that an arrangement for the non-possessory use of land survives the
transfer of that land into the hands of another. The basic rule is that “an easement,
once created and recorded, runs with the land and is a burden or benefit for all
successors in the chain of title.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
58. PATRICK J. ROHAN, CURRENT LEASING LAW AND TECHNIQUES—FORMS § 5.02 (2018).
The landlord and the original tenant are in privity of contract and privity of
estate. In an assignment, the assignee steps into the lessee’s shoes and acquires the
lessee’s rights in the lease. The assignment ends the privity of estate between the
lessor and lessee. Instead, privity of estate is created between the lessor and the
assignee. The assignee becomes bound by the covenants running with the land.
Privity of contract between the lessor and lessee, however, does not end by
the assignment and the lessee continues to be bound by the lease provisions.
Privity of contract is based on an agreement that usually includes the promise to
pay rent and honor other lease covenants. When the lessor and lessee sign a lease
agreement there is privity of contract between them, even if the lessee assigns or
sublets all or a portion of the premises, or vacates the premises before the end of
the lease term. Thus, if the tenant assigns its lease, the tenant remains in privity of
contract with the landlord and its liability continues even though the tenant has
given up its right to possession. The only way privity of contract is created
between the landlord and the assignee is if the latter assumes all of the original
tenant’s responsibilities under the lease.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908)
(“[The Copyright Act] depends upon . . . the authority conferred under article I, § 8, of the
Federal Constitution . . . .”).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
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Copyright ownership is more like a long-term lease. After the
“limited period” is over, the works join the public domain and the
public effectively owns the works.61 The prolonged period of
exclusivity causes people to forget that the public is the long-term
owner and beneficiary of copyright through expansion of the
public domain. The property interests of fair use are a limited
current benefit to the public in anticipation of the full benefits the
public will obtain when the author’s exclusive rights expire.
Considering fair use as an easement on the author’s creation
balances the current rights of the creator and the public.
In examining the treatment of fair use as an easement, section A
of this Part will consider the reasons for making the comparison
between fair use and easements. The reasoning will show that the
comparison is not only reasonable but beneficial. This Note will
then discuss two implications of the treatment of fair use as an
easement. Section B will analyze how considering fair use as an
easement alters the default presumptions about the role of fair use
in statutory interpretation. Section C will show that considering fair
use as an easement means other laws do not eliminate fair use
rights. In fact, attempts to block fair use easement rights may be
enjoined by a court.
A. Considering Fair Use an Easement Is a Natural Consequence
of the Parallels Between Copyright Law and Property Law
Copyright works like property, and fair use looks like an
easement. Whether copyright was created to be property or was
created and happened to look like property, copyright has now
been recognized as property for over 200 years.62 The Statute of

61. The public owns the works in the sense that they may freely exploit them. Nobody
has any exclusive rights to works in the public domain. Even if Congress removes items from
the public domain, the effect is temporary, and the works will eventually return to the public
domain. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
62. Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: of Piracy, Propertization,
and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1004 (2006).
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Anne63 of 1710 gave authors exclusive rights to their works.64 Prior
copying restrictions were authorized by the Licensing of the Press
Act of 1662 and enforced by the Stationers’ Company, a guild of
printers given the exclusive power to print—and the responsibility
to censor—literary works.65
The term “intellectual property,” which may seem of recent
origin, dates to the nineteenth century.66 Internationally, the
predecessor to the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) was the United International Bureaus for the Protection of
Intellectual Property, commonly known by its French acronym
BIRPI.67 BIRPI was formed in 1893 by combining two small agencies
that administered the Berne and Paris Conventions.68 “‘[I]ntellectual property’ was a conscious, nineteenth-century category
created to subsume both ‘literary property’ (Berne) and ‘industrial
property’ (Paris).”69
As embodied in the concept of copyright, courts have long
considered “literary property” as the exclusive rights of an
author.70 The legal encyclopedia American Jurisprudence contains a
section covering “the law of copyright and literary property.”71 In
63. The duration of copyright in the United States is historically related to the Statute
of Anne, 8 Ann. c. 19, enacted in England in 1709. 13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT Copyright Law Revision Study 30 § I, Lexis (Matthew Bender ed.,
rev. ed.).
That statute granted to the author and his assigns an original term of 14 years from
the date of publication plus a second term of 14 years should the author be living
at the expiration of the first term. Of statutes enacted between 1783 and 1786 by 12
of the Original 13 States, 6 followed the pattern of the Statute of Anne as did the
first Federal statute enacted by Congress in 1790.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Some references, including Nimmer, use 1709 rather than 1710 to refer
to the statute. The Statute “was enacted in the regnal year 1709 to 1710, and entered into force
on April 10, 1710.” The Statute of Anne: The First Copyright Statute, 1709, JEREMY NORMAN’S
HISTORYOF INFORMATION.COM, http://www.historyofinformation.com/expanded.php?id=3389.
64. Mark Rose, The Public Sphere and the Emergence of Copyright: Areopagitica, the
Stationers’ Company, and the Statute of Anne, 12 TUL . J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 123,
136–38 (2009).
65. Id.; see also Hughes, supra note 62, at 1009. Hughes extensively documents the
historic origin of literary property and the misapprehension that considering copyright a
form of property is a recent invention.
66. Id. at 1005–07.
67. Id. at 1005–06.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1006.
70. See 15 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT Copyright
Law Revision, Lexis (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed.).
71. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property Summary (2018).
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the United States, the phrase “intellectual property” first appeared
in the 1845 circuit court decision Davoll v. Brown.72 Although this
was the first use of the term in a court case, the concept was not
novel.73 Copyright had a long pedigree as property, with modifiers
of “artistic,” “literary,” or “intellectual” describing the type
of property.74
This section will consider five aspects of copyright and property
law that justify treating fair use as an easement.75 First, the right to
exclude is fundamental but limited. Second, easements align with
the limitations on copyright holders. Third, contract interpretation
to identify easements applies to the fair use portion of the
Copyright Act. Fourth, fair use controversies revolve around the
scope of the fair use easement. Fifth, breakdowns in the copyrightproperty comparison obscure but do not negate the comparison of
fair use as an easement. These breakdowns, however, suggest why
fair use hasn’t previously been associated with easements.
1. Right to exclude
The right to exclude others is the principle right of property
ownership.76 Third-party rights in property that limit the exclusive
rights of the owner are easements.

72. Hughes, supra note 62, at 1006; Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 3662) (“Only thus can ingenuity and perseverance be encouraged to exert themselves
in this way usefully to the community; and only in this way can we protect intellectual
property, the labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a man’s own, and as
much the fruit of his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears.”).
73. Hughes, supra note 62, at 1006.
74. Id.
75. Besides an easement analogy, other analogies are possible, but all fail in some
aspects of comparison. Analogies of fair use include the following: Fair use as a principle of
excuse to infringement. Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1787–88 (2010) (“[A]s an affirmative defense, fair use excuses a
defendant from liability where the defendant’s conduct is infringing . . . .”). Fair use as an
implied license—based on the statutory exemption to the owner’s rights—of which the
owner and public are aware. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1257 (11th Cir.
2014) (“[T]he grant to an author of copyright in a work is predicated upon a reciprocal grant
to the public by the work’s author of an implied license for fair use of the work.” (citing
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985))). Fair use as a
limitation on the exclusive rights in § 106 but without any other comparison. Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1994).
76. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
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A copyright holder may “exclude others from using his
property.”77 Further, “the Copyright Act provides that courts ‘may’
grant injunctive relief ‘on such terms as it may deem reasonable to
prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.’”78 The Court’s
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange tempered the prior presumption that injunctive relief should be a default response to
infringement but reaffirmed that exclusion was a fundamental
right in both copyright and patent infringement cases.79 The right
to exclude others granted by copyright aligns with the right to
exclude others in real80 property.
In neither copyright nor real property are exclusionary rights
absolute. Despite the strong presumption of the right to exclude,81
courts have expounded policy-based exceptions.82 When property

77. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
78. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (citing 17 U.S.C.

§ 502(a)). The injunctive relief available in copyright cases has clear parallels to trespass in
property law. In discussing an intentional trespass, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
recognized that “the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, which may be
minimal, but in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her
property . . . .” Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997). The court
concluded that punitive damages were appropriate even when compensatory damages were
nominal. Id. The right to exclude has no meaning unless the state supports the property
owner’s right with either an injunction or punitive damages against the violator. Id. at 160.
79. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392–93.
80. It is significant that the analogy of copyright leans more toward real property than
personal property. Trespasses to real property support punitive damages even when no
actual harm was done. For trespass to chattels, the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes clear
that an actual injury is required for a possessor to bring an action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 218(b)–(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Copyright law is strict liability, and statutory
damages apply without any showing of harm. On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172
(2d Cir. 2001), as amended (May 15, 2001) (“[P]unitive damages are not awarded in a statutory
copyright infringement action”; punishment for willful infringement is accomplished with
increases to statutory damages.).
81. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 156 (“[W]hen nominal damages are awarded for an
intentional trespass to land, punitive damages may, in the discretion of the jury,
be awarded.”).
82. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72 (N.J. 1971) (“[O]wnership of real
property does not include the right to bar access to governmental services available to
migrant workers . . . .”). In Shack two men, who worked for government-funded organizations that provided legal and health services to migrant workers, were barred from
accessing a farmer’s property. Id. at 370. The farmer offered to bring the workers to his office
for the visitors’ consultation, but attorney Shack and his companion declined saying “they
had the right to see the [workers] in the privacy of their living quarters and without [the
farmer’s] supervision.” Id. at 370–71. The farmer’s property right to exclude yielded to the
rights of workers on his property to receive visitors.
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rights conflict with others’ rights, one of the rights must yield.83 In
the case of copyright, fair use is an express limitation on the
exclusive rights of copyright holders.
Courts deal with exceptions to exclusive rights by balancing the
rights of the respective parties. Fair use contrasts with copyright
exclusiveness. Easements contrast with real property exclusiveness. For fair use, this balancing is illustrated by the third factor for
equitable relief outlined in eBay, which is to consider “the balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant.”84 Courts
similarly balance the equities in easement cases.85
In fair use, the character of the fair use and the impact on the
market are the dominant considerations. In Perfect 10 v. Amazon,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals balanced the fair use of
Google’s image search capability against the unauthorized use of
Perfect 10’s images.86 The court recognized that fair use provides “a
necessary counterbalance to the copyright law’s goal of protecting
creators’ work product.”87 The court found Google’s search met the
first fair use factor by being “transformative” and of a “different

83. EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN P ROPERTY LAW 23 (6th
ed. 2011).
84. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
85. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:32 (“A court of equity, however, may balance the
relative hardships of the parties and refuse an injunction when the expense of removing an
innocent encroachment would be disproportionate to the injury suffered by the easement
holder.”); see e.g., Vandeleigh Indus., LLC v. Storage Partners of Kirkwood, LLC, 901 A.2d
91, 96–102 (Del. 2006) (balancing equities, declining to order immediate removal of retaining
wall built in easement area, but requiring servient owner to remove wall when easement
holder demonstrated plan to use easement); Kitzinger v. Gulf Power Co., 432 So. 2d 188, 195
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that it would be inequitable to order removal of house
that encroached 18 feet into a 100-foot easement and did not currently interfere with utility
operations, but awarding nominal damages and stressing that easement holder’s rights were
superior if future expansion of utility services became necessary); Fettkether v. City of
Readlyn, 595 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (balancing hardships and enjoining
dominant owner from interfering with construction of home that mistakenly encroached 12
inches into 30-foot utility easement); Earl v. Pavex, Corp., 313 P.3d 154, 168 (Mont. 2013)
(adopting balancing test to determine whether encroachments, including structures and
cropland, must be removed and remanding case to decide if such encroachments constitute
unreasonable interference with easement holder’s rights); Marsh v. Hogan, 919 N.Y.S.2d 536,
538 (N.Y. 2011) (balancing equities and declining to order removal of house, which
encroached 10 feet into 50-foot access easement); Vossen v. Forrester, 963 P.2d 157, 162 (Or.
Ct. App. 1998) (balancing the hardships, declining to order removal of house which
innocently encroached on easement to minimal extent, and directing relocation of easement
over different portion of servient tract).
86. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007).
87. Id.
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character.”88 Further, because Google’s search engine did not harm
the market for Perfect 10’s full-size images, on balance, Google’s
overall actions were fair use.89
When balancing real property easements against the servient
property’s rights, courts focus on the nature of the easement and its
impact on the servient property. In Hayes v. Aquia Marina, Inc., a
marina sought to expand from 84 to 280 boat slips.90 Vehicle access
to the marina used an easement roadway, and the property owner
objected to the increased burden.91 The court evaluated the nature
of the easement in the original conveyance document and determined that the traffic to the marina was within the contemplated
nature of the easement.92 The increased traffic was reasonable and
of the same type contemplated within the original grant.93 The
marina’s expansion was a fair balance that did not unreasonably
burden the servient property.94
The fair use and easement cases began by considering the
nature of use. Google’s use was transformative. The marina’s use
was within the scope of its easement. Neither fair user was overburdening the respective servient property. In each case, the
respective court considered the impact of the proposed easement
use and determined it was reasonable and allowable. For copyright,
a transformative use that benefits the public is a proper balance to
the owner’s rights. The world would be a much worse place if

88. Id. at 1164–65 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994))
(internal quotation omitted).
89. Id. at 1168.
90. Hayes v. Aquia Marina, Inc., 414 S.E.2d 820, 821 (Va. 1992).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 822.
93. Id.
As a general rule, when an easement is created by grant or reservation and
the instrument creating the easement does not limit the use to be made of it, the
easement may be used for “any purpose to which the dominant estate may then,
or in the future, reasonably be devoted.” Stated differently, an easement created
by a general grant or reservation, without words limiting it to any particular use
of the dominant estate, is not affected by any reasonable change in the use of the
dominant estate.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 823.

1091

003.KOWALLIS_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/4/19 4:36 PM

2018

search engines did not have the right to index information on
the Internet.95
Copyright, as well as patents, secure “for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”96
Congress’ [sic] exercise of its authority, under [the Federal Constitution’s intellectual property clause97], to grant copyrights and
patents for limited times involves . . . a balance between (1) the
interests of authors and inventors in their works; and (2) society’s
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce.98

This limited monopoly is a carrot to encourage creativity that
will eventually belong to the public.99
The key difference when treating fair use as an easement is the
parties are conflicting property owners rather than an owner and
an alleged infringer. A distinguishing feature of property common
law is balancing property-owner rights with easement-owner rights.
The Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) says the following:

95. For example, although an image may have been created for other reasons, a search
engine transforms an image into pointers to information in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. “[T]he Supreme Court has . . . concluded that the
limited-times provision of Art I, § 8, cl 8 does not authorize Congress to create copyrights or
patents of unlimited duration . . . .” Gary Knapp, Annotation, Supreme Court’s Construction
and Application of Limited-Times Provision in Federal Constitution’s Art I, § 8, cl 8, Authorizing
Congress to Provide “for Limited Times” Copyright and Patent Protection, 154 U.S. SUP. CT. LAW.
ED. 2D 1185 (2012) (citation omitted).
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
98. Knapp supra note 96, at 1185.
99. In a frequently cited case establishing the balance of private monopoly and eventual public benefit, the Supreme Court said,
The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like
the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of
competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an “author’s” creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good. “The sole interest of the United States and the primary object
in conferring the monopoly,” this Court has said, “lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.” When technological change has
rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light
of this basic purpose.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (citations omitted).
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In resolving conflicts among the parties to servitudes, the public
policy favoring socially productive use of land generally leads to
striking a balance that maximizes the aggregate utility of the
servitude beneficiary and the servient estate. . . . Aggregate utility
is generally produced by interpreting an easement to strike a
balance that maximizes its utility while minimizing the impact on
the servient estate.100

2. Easements limit the right to exclude
An easement is a right to use another’s property for a defined
purpose and not subject to revocation by the property owner.101 The
easement limits the property owner’s right to exclude.
As with real property easements,102 fair users do not need
explicit permission to use their rights, and a denial of the right to
fairly use a work does not negate fair use rights.103 A fair use may
significantly harm the market for a copyrighted work,104 but the
owner has exclusive rights over efforts to usurp their works rather

100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.10 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
101. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:1.
102. Ludwig v. Spoklie, 930 P.2d 56, 59 (Mont. 1996) (stating that a valid easement

holder is not required to obtain permission to use the easement from the servient
estate owner).
103. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994) (“If the use is otherwise fair, then no permission need be sought or granted. Thus, being denied permission to
use a work does not weigh against a finding of fair use.”). In Campbell, the copyright owner
de-nied permission to create a derogatory musical parody. The music group 2 Live Crew
created the song anyway, and the Supreme Court held that the musical parody was fair use.
Id.
104. Id. at 591–92.
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than degrade them.105 Fair use conveys rights to third parties,
which a property owner might wish to eliminate but cannot.106
Just as Congress struggled over the impact of technological
change on copyright,107 courts have struggled to balance rights
when easements change utilization and owners claim the servient
estate is overburdened.108 In the copyright realm, Congress initially
105. Id. In a case on parody, the Court outlined how fair use could degrade the value
of a copyrighted work yet still be fair.
Because “parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying
it commercially as well as artistically,” the role of the courts is to distinguish
between “[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright
infringement[, which] usurps it.”
This distinction between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement is reflected in the rule that there is no protectible
derivative market for criticism. The market for potential derivative uses includes
only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license
others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will
license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses
from the very notion of a potential licensing market. “People ask . . . for criticism,
but they only want praise.” Thus, to the extent that the opinion below may be read
to have considered harm to the market for parodies of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the
court erred.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
106. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 444 (1984)
(holding that time shifting was fair use, despite owners efforts to enjoin home VCR taping;
stating that “an injunction which seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an extremely harsh remedy”);
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571–72 (holding that parody was fair use despite potentially negative
impact on the market for the original song and owner’s effort to block song parody).
107. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 673, 680 (2000) [hereinafter Riff on Fair Use] (“The millennial hope underlying the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act is to bring U.S. copyright law ‘squarely into the digital
age.’” (citing REPORT OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998))); id.
at 681–82 (saying Congress sought to balance the interests of copyright proprietors against
the interests of the community of users, scholars, equipment manufacturers, and online
service providers).
108. An easement is allowed to reasonably increase the burden on the servient estate
through higher utilization. See e.g., Clinger v. Hartshorn, 89 P.3d 462, 467 (Colo. App. 2003),
as modified on denial of reh’g, (Dec. 11, 2003) (holding that increased use of prescriptive
roadway easement by hunters in connection with outfitting business did not constitute
overburden); Rehl v. Billetz, 963 N.E.2d 1, 5–8 (Ind. App. 2012) (holding that increased
vehicle traffic using easement of ingress and egress to commercial campground on dominant
estate did not overburden servient property); City of Charlotte v. BMJ of Charlotte, LLC, 675
S.E.2d 59, 70–72 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that increased rail traffic did not amount to
overburden of railroad easement); Logan v. Brodrick, 631 P.2d 429, 432 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that increase in traffic over easement giving access to lake resort not unreasonable);
see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:13.
Changes in type of burden may be inappropriate. See e.g., Wright v. Horse Creek
Ranches, 697 P.2d 384, 390–91 (Colo. 1985) (holding that shift of dominant estate from
agricultural enterprise to recreational area would subject servient estate to undue burden
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focused on the rights of copyright holders when drafting the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) out of concern that
emerging technology would diminish the value of intellectual
property.109 A more balanced version emerged that recognized
copyright owners but offered limitations as well as provisions for
further rulemaking.110
Easement use may expand beyond the original usage but may
not unreasonably increase the burden on the servient estate.111
According to a property law treatise, “courts balance the dominant
owner’s right to enjoy the easement and take advantage of
technological innovations with the servient owner’s right to make
all use of the servient land that does not interfere with
the servitude.”112
Fair use is a third party’s right to use the copyrighted work of
another. These fair use rights are expressly reserved by the same
statute articulating the property right. The bounded fair use rights
are at odds with the copyright holder and may financially interfere.
because increased traffic would interfere with ranching); Schwob v. Green, 215 N.W.2d 240,
243 (Iowa 1974) (finding that where dominant estate was changed from private use to
commercial campground, resulting traffic constituted additional burden on servient estate);
Dennis v. French, 369 A.2d 1386, 1387–88 (Vt. 1977) (holding that use of prescriptive
easement in roadway acquired by seasonal and agricultural use for access to newly erected
home increased burden on servient estate); see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:13.
109. David Nimmer reports that the Judiciary Committee’s initial basic provision
would have been absolute, with no solicitude for fair use. Riff on Fair Use, supra note 107,
at 694.
As reported by the House Judiciary Committee, the basic provision was
intended to impose absolute liability against those who lack authorized access. It
was only when the subject access was authorized that “the traditional defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use, would be fully applicable.” The upshot is that fair use would apply only following lawful access, not as a basis for
obtaining such access in the first instance. “[A]n individual would not be able to
circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a work, but would be able to
do so in order to make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired lawfully.”
Id. at 716 (footnotes omitted) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998)).
110. Significant opposition from private- and public-sector interests led Congress to
expand potential protections. Riff on Fair Use, supra note 107, at 717 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105551, at 25, 35 (1998)).
The House Commerce Committee devoted considerable attention to the perceived
dangers in the approach of its sister committee. Its concern was that the basic
provision of section 1201, as originally drafted by the Clinton administration and
reported out by the Judiciary Committee, would threaten to “lock up” works
falling within the scope of its protection.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
111. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:13.
112. Id.
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Facing technological change, Congress directly addressed the balancing required with the emergence of modern technology that
could facilitate infringement. Adopting the phrasing of the property law treatise, Congress sought to balance the fair users’ right to
enjoy their easement and take advantage of technological innovation with the copyright owners’ right to make financial use of their
exclusive rights.
Easements limit the right of property owners to exclude the
easement holder from their authorized use of the servient property. The fair use limitations on copyright holder’s exclusive rights
follow that same pattern.
3. Inferring easements in a conveyance
The principles by which courts determine if a conveyance
creates an easement suggest that fair use is an easement. Courts first
look to see if an agreement explicitly creates an easement. When the
language of an agreement granting rights in the property of another
is not explicit in creating an easement, courts must determine if an
easement was created based on the party’s apparent intent.
Regarding easement language in agreements, the Supreme
Court of Vermont said the “law requires no technical formula of
words to create a servitude against one property in favor of
another. The only essential is that the parties make clear their
intention to establish an easement.”113 Such an intention is clear by
an express granting of rights to a third party that limits the property owner’s exclusive rights and is not revocable by the owner.114
A common example of easement creation is when property owners
convey land and reserve an easement for themselves.115 In such a

113. Scanlan v. Hopkins, 270 A.2d 352, 355 (Vt. 1970).
114. See, e.g., Kapp v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 350 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (M.D. Pa. 2004)

(“Easements will be recognized only when the owner clearly intended to limit the rights of
his or her estate. And they will have effect against subsequent purchasers of the servient
estate only when those purchasers had notice, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of the easement. Easements may be created by express agreement, by implication, by
estoppel, or by operation of law.” (citations omitted)); Skeen v. Boyles, 213 P.3d 531, 538
(N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (“[I]n Martinez v. Martinez, 604 P.2d 366, 368 (N.M. 1979), the intent to
create an easement was inferred from language in a deed providing for ‘rights of ingress and
egress[,]’ even though there was no express granting language. Id. . . . There, the court
recognized that the term ‘easement’ is generic for a ‘liberty, privilege, right or advantage
which one has in the land of another.’” (citation standardized)).
115. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 57, § 60.03.
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case, the conveyance document itself is the written instrument
which creates the easement.116
For copyright, the document that grants an owner exclusive
rights is the Copyright Act.117 That same document, in § 107,
expressly limits the exclusive rights of copyright holders by reserving fair use rights to the public.118 While typical property terms such
as “grant” or “convey” are absent, the limitation of property-holder
rights is clear, and there is no provision for a copyright holder to
revoke those rights.119
When courts do not find explicit easement language in a conveyance document, they must evaluate intent to see if an easement
was inferred. Several elements are important in ascertaining an
intent to create an easement: (1) the use of words ordinarily used in
the conveyances of real estate is a non-dispositive factor; (2) the
creation of a defined right in a particular portion of the servient
estate indicates that an easement was intended; and (3) the lack of
power to revoke suggests an easement, whereas power to revoke
would suggest a license.120
First, the intent of the parties is more important than the words
used.121 In an early Massachusetts case,122 the owner of a building
executed a written document to an advertiser that granted
the exclusive right and privilege to maintain [an] advertising
sign . . . ten feet by twenty-five feet on [the] wall of [the]
building . . . for a period of one year with the privilege of a

116. See id.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A,

the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”). The section title
is “Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use.” Id.
119. While copyright holders do not have any power to revoke the rights of fair users,
Congress may be able to. A recent Supreme Court case held patents were public rights and
Congress had “significant latitude to assign adjudication of public rights to entities other
than Article III courts.” Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018). Oil States Energy dealt with the right of the government to revoke
property rights previously granted. Because of the public-right nature of patents, the
revocation was lawful. Copyrights may also be construed as public rights. As a public right,
Congress may be able to change the formulation for assigning and adjudicating
copyright rights.
120. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:5.
121. See generally Baseball Pub. Co. v. Bruton, 18 N.E.2d 362 (Mass. 1938).
122. Id.
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renewal from year to year for four years more at the
same consideration.123

The advertiser mailed consideration, which the owner
returned.124 The advertiser placed the agreed-upon sign, which the
owner removed.125 The advertiser claimed a lease, but the owner
claimed a revocable license.126 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts concluded the advertiser owned an easement in
gross127 and affirmed a trial court decree for specific performance.128
The appearance of an easement overpowered the terminology used
in the agreement.129 The use of the term “lease” in the document
was not dispositive.130
Second, rights must be created on land owned by another.131 In
the Massachusetts case already mentioned, the contract granted
more than permission to perform an act on the land; the advertiser
received the “exclusive right and privilege to maintain” a sign on a
particular portion of the landowner’s property.132 This interest fell
short of a lease because the landowner retained possession of the
wall.133 However, the right was for a year with optional extensions—a situation more consistent with the concept of a lease or
easement than with the concept of a license.134
Third, when the owner lacks power to revoke third-party
rights, an easement is created. In an Iowa case, a farmer sold a large

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:6.
Baseball, 18 N.E.2d at 363.
Id.
Id.
BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 2:2 (“An easement in gross benefits its holder
whether or not the holder owns or possesses other land. There is a servient estate, but no
dominant estate. Hence, an easement in gross may be described as an irrevocable personal
interest in the land of another.” (footnote omitted)).
128. Baseball, 18 N.E.2d at 365.
129. Id. at 364. For a case applying the Baseball Pub. Co. analysis and reaching a similar
conclusion, see Commercial Wharf E. Condo. Ass’n v. Waterfront Parking Corp., 552 N.E.2d 66,
74 (Mass. 1990) (finding that retained parking rights were an easement, not lease, license, or
management contract).
130. Baseball, 18 N.E.2d at 364; see also Millbrook Hunt, Inc. v. Smith, 670 N.Y.S.2d 907,
908–09 (1998).
131. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 11:1 (“A license is the permission to do something
on the land of another . . . .”).
132. Baseball, 18 N.E.2d at 362–64.
133. Id. at 363–64.
134. See id. at 364–65; see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:6.
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parcel of land to the buyer under an installment land contract.135
The farmer agreed in the contract that the buyer would “have [the]
privilege of driving thru [sic] the south boundary forty feet of her
farm so long as gates [were] kept locked.”136 The contract also gave
the buyer the right of first refusal to purchase the driveway area if
the farmer decided to sell the farm.137 The buyer assigned the land
contract, but the farmer refused to allow the assignee to cross the
farm.138 The assignee brought suit for specific performance, claiming an easement.139 The farmer defended, claiming the contract
provided only for a non-assignable and revocable license.140 The
trial court granted specific performance.141 The Supreme Court of
Iowa affirmed, concluding that an easement was created.142 In
reaching its decision, the court focused on the nature and the
expected duration of the right, a roadway of convenience that the
buyer and the buyer’s successors would find useful for a
considerable period of time.143 The inability of a servient estate
owner to terminate rights is the most important feature of an
easement compared to a license.144

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Paul v. Blakely, 51 N.W.2d 405, 406 (Iowa 1952).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 408
Id.
Id. at 407. This case is an example in the treatise The Law of Easements and Licenses
in Land. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:6.
144. See SOP, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Nat. Res., Div. of Parks & Outdoor Recreation, 310
P.3d 962, 967 (Alaska 2013). The Massachusetts case previously discussed, Baseball Pub. Co. v.
Bruton, outlined some of the differences between a lease, a license, and an easement.
The distinction between a lease and a license is plain, although at times it is
hard to classify a particular instrument. A lease of land conveys an interest in
land . . . and transfers possession. A license merely excuses acts done by one on
land in possession of another that without the license would be trespasses, conveys
no interest in land, and may be contracted for or given orally. . . .
Subject to the right of a licensee to be on the land of another for a reasonable
time after the revocation of a license, for the purpose of removing his chattels, it is
of the essence of a license that it is revocable at the will of the possessor of the land.
The revocation of a license may constitute a breach of contract, and give rise to an
action for damages. But it is none the less effective to deprive the licensee of all
justification for entering or remaining upon the land.
Baseball Pub. Co. v. Bruton, 18 N.E.2d 362, 363–64 (Mass. 1938) (citations omitted). The Massachusetts court concluded the agreement created an easement. Id.
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Although § 107 does not use express easement creation
language, an easement may be inferred from the language and
intent of the statute.145 Section 107 both creates and limits the
exclusive rights of the property holder. The absence of conveyance
language is not dispositive, and each of the other two elements
courts evaluate to infer an easement are found in the fair use section
of the Copyright Act. For the second point, requiring rights in
another’s property, § 107 provides specific bounds to third-party
rights in the copyright property owned by another. For the third
point, that easements are non-terminable, these fair use rights of
third parties to act on the copyright property of the owner have no
provision for revocation or termination. The inability of property
owners to revoke or limit the fair use rights is significant and
suggests creation of an easement on the owner’s property. Each of
these points deserves elaboration.
The second element courts use to infer an easement is the
creation of a defined right in a particular portion of a servient
estate.146 Fair use defines the bounds of these third-party rights in
the copyright owner’s property.
Fair use differs from other copyright limitations because it
defines allowable use of another’s property as opposed to limitations defining the scope of the owner’s property.147 Copyright
limitations protecting facts, ideas, or information already in the
public domain limit the scope of what an author may copyright.148
Fair use grants the public rights to use copyrightable expression in

145. Legislatively created easements are commonly challenged as takings. See BRUCE &
ELY, supra note 54, § 12:10. However, in the case of the Copyright Act, the same legislation
that grants property rights creates the limitation of fair use that this Note advocates should
be considered an easement. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (2018).
146. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:5.
147. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102–05, 113–15 (2018), which define the scope of copyrightable material. Separate arguments could be made for why other limitations to exclusive
rights (e.g., §§ 108–12) could be considered easements.
148. Copyright protection covers works of authorship in the categories “(1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound
recordings; and (8) architectural works.” Id. § 102. The same section explicitly limits copyrightable works saying, “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.” Id.
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limited ways despite the otherwise exclusive rights of the copyright holder. 149
Fair use defines the scope of allowable actions with another
person’s property. In comparison, the fair use factors enumerated
in § 107 may reasonably be rephrased in more traditional property
terms as follows. Courts consider (1) the nature of third-party use,
(2) the nature of the property, (3) the significance of third-party use
of the property in proportion to the property as a whole, and (4) the
impact of the third-party use upon the value of the property.150 In
copyright cases, courts have emphasized factors one151 and four152
and minimized two153 and three.154 Similarly, in easement cases,
149. Section 107 presupposes the “use of a copyrighted work” but carves out allowable fair uses as outside of the owner’s exclusive rights. Id. § 107.
150. See id. (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”)
151. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584 (“[T]he outcome of factor one coincided with the outcome of the
overall test in 81.5% of these same opinions.”); see also, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]ransformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding
of fair use . . . . [but s]uch works . . . lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright and the more transformative the new work,
the less will be the significance of other factors . . . .” (citations omitted)).
152. Beebe, supra note 151, at 584. (“[T]he outcome of factor four coincided with the
outcome of the overall test in 83.8% of the 297 dispositive opinions . . . .”).
As for the combined influence of factors one and four, in 214 (or 72.1%) of the
opinions, factors one and four either both favored or both disfavored fair use. In
all but one of these opinions, the outcome of the fair use test followed the outcome
of these two factors. What happened when, if ever, factor one favored (or
disfavored) fair use while factor four disfavored (or favored) fair use? Did one of
these leading factors consistently trump the other? Factors one and four pointed
in opposite directions in only 20 of the opinions. In 14 of these opinions, the
outcome of the test followed the outcome of factor four, while in 6, the outcome of
the test followed the outcome of factor one. Though hardly conclusive, this
breakdown is consistent with the conventional view that factor four exerts the
stronger influence on the outcome of the test.
Id. at 584–85.
153. Id. at 584 (“[T]he outcome of factor two coincided with the outcome of the overall
test in 50.2% of these opinions. . . .”).
154. Id. at 583 (“As for factors two and three . . . , commentators tend to regard these, if
they regard them at all, as peripheral to the outcome of the test.”); see also, e.g., Field v. Google
Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Nev. 2006) (“[E]ven copying of entire works should not weigh
against a fair use finding where the new use serves a different function from the original,
and the original work can be viewed by anyone free of charge.”); C.T. Drechsler, Annotation,
Extent of Doctrine of “Fair Use” Under Federal Copyright Act, 23 A.L.R. 3d 139 (1969).
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courts are concerned with the nature of an easement use155—like
fair use factor one—and the impact of that use156—like fair use
factor four—on the servient property.
The third element courts use to infer an easement is the inability
of the owner to revoke the easement.157 The inability to revoke is
considered the most dispositive element in easement cases.158 In the
case of fair use, the simple fact is that the inability to revoke fair use
is so obvious to copyright owners that revoking fair use has never
been asserted by a copyright owner. In one of the seminal cases on
copyright, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,159 the Supreme Court
acknowledged the negative impact a musical parody could have on
an original song.160 Yet despite the potentially negative impact,
parody is a fair use.161 Copyright owners do not have power to
prevent fair use of their works.162
While explicit easement terms are missing from § 107, the
language and intent strongly infer an easement. Common law
reasoning may infer an easement even without a conveyance
document.163 However, § 107 provides a written document that

155. “The grant of an unrestricted easement, not specifically defined as to the burden
imposed on the servient land, entitles the easement holder to a use limited only by the
requirement that it be reasonably necessary and consistent with the purposes for which the
easement was granted.” WEST’S ALR DIGEST Easements II.k51, ALRDG 141K51 (updated Dec.
2018) (citing City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co., 110 P.2d 983
(Cal. 1941)).
156. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:13; see also, e.g., Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc.,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Sept. 6, 1995) (“The
owner of the dominant tenement must use his or her easements and rights in such a way as
to impose as slight a burden as possible on the servient tenement.”); Brock v. B & M Moster
Farms, Inc., 481 N.E.2d 1106, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (“An easement cannot be changed to
subject the servient estate to a greater burden than was originally agreed upon without the
consent of the owner of the servient estate.”); C & M Prop. Mgmt. Co. v. Bluffs U.P. Emps.
Credit Union, 486 N.W.2d 596, 597 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (“Generally, the servient estate is
not to be burdened to a greater extent than was contemplated at the time of the creation of
the easement.”); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife Res. v. Garner, 896 S.W.2d 10, 14
(Ky. 1995); Thies v. Howland, 380 N.W.2d 463, 471 (Mich. 1985); Dennis v. French, 369 A.2d
1386, 1388 (Vt. 1977) (“[T]he owner of an easement cannot materially increase the burden of
it upon the servient estate, nor impose a new or additional burden thereon.”).
157. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:5.
158. See supra note 144.
159. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
160. Id. at 592–93.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:1 (“Easements are created expressly, implied in
certain circumstances, established by prescriptive use, or obtained by estoppel, custom,
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outlines the scope of third-party rights in copyright owner’s property that cannot be revoked by owners. Patry on Copyright notes the
increasing tendency of courts to statutorily interpret fair use
“codified” in § 107 as opposed to using common law reasoning to
balance the rights of the parties.164 Evaluating the terms of fair use
with a common law perspective shows the strong parallels between fair use and an easement.
4. Fair use controversies regard the scope of a fair use easement
The dispute in most fair use litigation hinges on the scope of fair
use and if the defendant’s actions qualify as fair use.165 While the
legal parallels between easements and fair use still apply, the
typical fact patterns are much different.166
The fair use qualifications are not bright lines, and litigants
argue if a use is indeed fair.167 The fair use factors must each be
considered.168 No factor is dispositive, and courts have not

public trust, condemnation or equity.”); see also id. § 6:2 (describing the common law reasoning the Oregon Supreme Court used to imply easements for public access to beaches).
164. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:8 (2018).
The constitutional balance between sufficient incentives to authors and reasonable, unconsented-to and uncompensated uses by the public can be maintained
only if courts fully and comfortably don their common-law hats. Failure to do so
is likely to result in formulaic decisions reciting phrases from the statute and case
law, instead of meaningful opinions that engage in the sensitive balancing of
policy decisions that are the essence of fair use.
Id. In a footnote, Patry further expounds the point. “In a study of fair use opinions over a 27year period, Professor Barton has argued that courts abdicate their responsibilities in favor
of a robot-like run through the factors.” Id. n.7 (citing Beebe, supra note 151, at 561–62)
(“[C]ourts often acknowledged that the four-factor test should not be applied
formulaically; . . . Yet the data show that after an initial period of flexibility, judges shifted in
the late 1980s toward a rhetorically quite formal and explicit treatment of the Section
107 factors.”)).
165. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05, Lexis
(Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed.). (“Fair use is said to constitute a mixed issue of law and fact,
but what facts will be sufficient to raise this defense in any given case is not easily answered.
One case calls this obscure doctrine of fair use ‘the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright.’ Another notes that the ‘doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually
to defy definition.’” (footnotes omitted)).
166. Id.
167. Even though cases fleshing out the contours of fair use are not rare, there is still
great debate about what qualifies as fair use. Id. (“[M]ore law review articles are published
about fair use than cases actually adjudicating the subject!”).
168. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (“Section
107 requires a case-by-case determination whether a particular use is fair, and the statute
notes four nonexclusive factors to be considered.”).
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provided any consistent methodology for weighing the factors.169
Under these circumstances, fair use outcomes are case-by-case, fact
dependent, and hard to predict.170
Express easements are specified contractually, and drafters
presumably seek clarity to avoid uncertainty in litigation.171
Easements may also inferentially arise through need or consistent
use.172 Once courts determine an action is within the scope of an
easement, they balance the rights of the parties in dispute.173
Treating fair use as an easement would not alter the difficulty
of determining if use of a copyrighted work is fair but would
provide a better framework to analyze the scope of fair use and then
balance the respective rights. Some of the existing fair use factors
are more about balancing the needs of the public and the copyright
owner than determining if a use is fair.174 An easement-based
framework would more clearly delineate elements defining uses
that are fair from elements that balance the respective positions. It
would still be the case that when an easement holder exceeds the
scope of their easement they are trespassing and are subject to the

169. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (“In giving virtually
dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the Court of Appeals erred.”);
Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We acknowledge the
porous nature of the factors . . . . Over time, there has been a shift in analytical emphasis
in the fair use factors . . . . [emphasizing t]he relative importance of factor one—’the
purpose and character’ of the use—and factor four—’the effect of the use upon the
potential market’ . . . .”).
170. 4 NIMMER, supra note 165, § 13.05.
171. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“‘The extent of an
easement created by a conveyance is fixed by the conveyance.’ . . . ‘[W]hen precise language
is employed to create an easement, such terminology governs the extent of usage.’” (quoting
5 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 482 (AM. LAW INST. 1944))).
172. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:12 (“The scope of a prescriptive easement is
determined by the adverse usage through which it was acquired.”); see also id. § 4:5 (easements of necessity presume that grants of landlocked property include an implied easement
to access the landlocked parcel by crossing the servient property).
173. Herndon v. McKinley, 586 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (stressing need to
balance interests of parties and finding that erection of third gate across passageway was
unreasonable burden absent evidence showing third gate was essential); see also BRUCE &
ELY, supra note 54, § 8:25.
174. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (weighing the transformative nature of the fair use
compared with the market harm). Cases balance and weigh the factors in describing the fair
use. The courts are conflating the scope of the fair use easement with the balance of harms
considerations. Courts simply call what is allowed “fair use” and what is infringing “not fair
use.” It is no wonder that fair use analysis is hard to predict.
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consequences of violation.175 When a person’s use of a copyrighted
work is not fair, they are infringing the copyright and are subject to
the Copyright Act’s consequences. Fair use as an easement is
consistent with current fair use litigation outcomes, and an easement perspective could provide a helpful framework for understanding the significance of the fair use factors.
5. Breakdowns in the copyright property analogy
The intangible nature of copyright causes a breakdown in this
Note’s proposed real property analogy.176 This breakdown does not
negate the parallel of fair use to easements, but it makes it less
obvious and explains why fair use has not already been analogized
to an easement.177 Copyright holders do not possess property in the
175. Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008) (defendants charged with criminal
trespass for exceeding the scope of a public easement).
176. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1545–46
(1989) (discussing the breakdown between copyright and property analogies); Molly H.
Sherden, Book Review: The Commercial Law of Intellectual Property, 39 BOSTON B.J.,
Mar./Apr. 1995, at 27, 27–28 (reviewing PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL
LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1994)) (recognizing the difficulty of applying the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) to intellectual property because of its intangible nature and
explaining, thus, “it is more difficult to identify the location and actual possession of these
assets than it is for tangible goods,” which are concepts inherent in many aspects of the UCC).
177. See, e.g., Russ VerSteeg, The Roman Law Roots of Copyright, 59 MD. L. REV. 522, 532–
33 (2000).
[T]he Romans recognized that, technically speaking, intangibles could not be
possessed in the same manner as tangibles. Because they could not be held in hand
like physical objects, discrete rules regarding the sale and transfer of res incorporales
developed. The first res incorporales recognized by Roman law were the “praedial
servitudes.” These servitudes—analogous in many respects to modern
easements—were four in number: iter (the right to travel over another’s land); actus
(the right to drive animals over another’s land); via (the right to have a road over
another’s land); and, aquaeductus (the right to draw water over another’s land).
Eventually, in addition to servitudes like these (intangible rights dependent upon
an association with land—similar to our easements appurtenant), Roman law also
recognized personal servitudes (somewhat similar to the modern easements in
gross) that were not tied to real property. For example, operae servorum was a kind
of personal servitude (usus) that entitled a third party to use another’s slave’s
services. In any event, copyright—as an intangible property—is similar in some
respects to the praedial servitudes. Although a copyright is not tied directly to
land, it is linked in some fashion to a material object, since, to be copyrightable, a
work must be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”
Id. (footnotes omitted). Because copyright itself is immaterial, the analogies to easements
created by limitations on exclusive rights were not obvious. Easements are associated with
third-party rights in tangible objects. Mazzone’s recent article “Copyright Easements” is an
exception; it recognized creating limitations on copyright using easements but did not
directly equate fair use to an easement. Supra note 8.
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same sense that landowners possess property, because copyright is
intangible.178 Embodiments of copyright are tangibly possessed
and their relationship to copyright is authorized by the copyright
holder; therefore copyright frequently uses license and lease
analogies.179 Despite this, an easement is the better analogy for
fair use.
An easement is a better analogy for various reasons. First,
possession of property is not synonymous with ownership.180 A
“bundle of sticks” analogy has long been used to describe the rights
that make up property ownership.181 An owner may delegate the
right to use property while retaining ownership.182 In a lease, the
tenant possesses the property subject to the lease terms but does not
own the property.183 In the case of real property there is no tangible
distinction between the property owned by the owner and the
property possessed by the tenant.
Furthermore, copyright ownership is separate from ownership
of an embodiment of the copyright.184 Copyright owners may
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2018); see also Lacey, supra note 176, at 1545–46.
179. The Copyright Act itself contemplates the rental, lease, or licensing of copyrighted

works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2018) (providing the exclusive right “to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending”).
180. For real property, leases are a common example of the difference between
ownership and possession. For the case of copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2018):
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is
embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights
in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an
agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights
under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.
Id.
181. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002).
182. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02, Lexis
(Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed.).
183. Historically, tenants could potentially recover damages from landlords who improperly entered the property. Warren v. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188, 202 (1883) (“A mere trespass
by the landlord upon the premises . . . may entitle the tenant to recover damages, but it will
not amount to an eviction.”).
184. Section 202 of the Copyright Act explicitly states this. 17 U.S.C. § 202. The principle
is further expounded in the House report discussing this section of the copyright law.
The principle restated in section 202 is a fundamental and important one: that
copyright ownership and ownership of a material object in which the copyrighted
work is embodied are entirely separate things. Thus, transfer of a material object
does not of itself carry any rights under the copyright, and this includes transfer
of the copy or phonorecord—the original manuscript, the photographic negative,
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disseminate selected rights from their bundle of sticks regardless of
the materiality of copyright.185 Copyright holders may license to
either exclusive or nonexclusive licensees.186 They may separately
authorize the making, distributing, and importing of their products.
Real property easements are non-possessory rights to material
property.187 Despite the traditional distinction between an easement and its corresponding tangible property, the easement
definition does not require tangible property. Mazzone’s article,
“Copyright Easements,”188 argues that easements could apply to
copyright.189 Although not stated in Mazzone’s article, fair use itself
could qualify as an easement.
Although fair use is not a possessory interest, it is still a property right. Fair use is neither ownership of copyright nor a license.190
The rights enumerated in § 106191 belong to the copyright owners
or their authorized assignees. Fair use belongs to the public and,

the unique painting or statue, the master tape recording, etc.—in which the work
was first fixed. Conversely, transfer of a copyright does not necessarily require the
conveyance of any material object.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739.
185. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 288 (2002) (“[T]he transformation of the United States
economy beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing into the twentieth century
from agrarian to industrial to information-based required an understanding of property that
could encompass complex legal and financial relationships, disaggregate ownership into a
variety of interests held by a variety of stakeholders, and accommodate rights
in intangibles.”).
186. Section 201 of the Copyright Act provides for division of rights. 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(d)(2) (2018); see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 182, § 10.02 (“Section 201(d)(2) of the
Copyright Act is said to constitute an ‘explicit statutory recognition of the principle of
divisibility of copyright.’”). It is important to distinguish between the rights granted to
exclusive and nonexclusive licensees. Only exclusive licensees receive exclusive rights
potentially recognized as copyright interests. See id. (“An exclusive license, even if it is
‘limited in time or place of effect,’ is equated with an assignment, and each is considered to
be a ‘transfer’ of copyright ownership.” (footnote omitted)); 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2018).
187. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 1:1.
188. Mazzone, Copyright Easements, supra note 8.
189. Id. at 726 (suggesting authors assign publishers a significant interest, but not the
entire interest, and retain an easement for themselves “to ensure future productive uses of
the work without any need to obtain permission from the assignee publisher” (parenthesis omitted)).
190. If fair use were a license, copyright owners would revoke it. The statutory right of
fair use and the inability for it to be revoked by property owners is one of the strongest
indications that fair use is not like a license.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018) ((1) to reproduce the work; (2) to prepare derivative works;
(3) to distribute copies; (4) to perform the work publicly; (5) to display the work publicly;
and (6) to perform by digital audio transmission).
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although constrained and balanced by the rights belonging to the
copyright holder, cannot be extinguished.
The copyright-property comparison further breaks down when
considering the transition of exclusive rights from the owner to the
public. When formerly copyrighted works enter the public domain,
exclusive rights expire.192 The non-rivalrous nature of intellectual
property ensures that public access is truly open once exclusive
rights dissolve.193
Additionally, the term “public property” may mean “owned by
the government” or it may mean “dedicated to public use.”194 For
real property, public land must be owned by the government
because of the rivalrous nature of land. For non-rivalrous intellectual property, no one owns the public domain, and the nonrivalrous nature and lack of exclusive rights are simply a hopeful
means to ensure fair public access.195
Despite these differences, copyright is analogous to property.
Despite copyright being intangible, it may have easements that
limit an owner’s exclusive rights. Strengthened property interests

192. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012).

To copyright lawyers, the ‘vested rights’ formulation might sound exactly
backwards: Rights typically vest at the outset of copyright protection, in an author
or rightholder. Once the term of protection ends, the works do not revest in any
rightholder. Instead, the works simply lapse into the public domain. Anyone has
free access to the public domain, but no one, after the copyright term has expired,
acquires ownership rights in the once-protected works.
Id. at 331–32 (internal citations omitted).
193. Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1033 (2006) (“Once the
copyright expires, the work falls into the public domain, where anybody is free to use it.”).
Despite the intent of the public domain, Mazzone discusses the prevalence of, and lack of
remedies for, people claiming copyright in public domain works. See id.
194. “[P]ublic property: n. property owned by the government or one of its agencies,
divisions, or entities. Commonly a reference to parks, playgrounds, streets, sidewalks,
schools, libraries and other property regularly used by the general public.” Public property,
FREE DICTIONARY, LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/pub
lic+property (last visited Dec. 31, 2018).
195. See Mazzone, Copyfraud, supra note 193, at 1037.
[N]o federal agency is specially charged with safeguarding the public domain.
There is no Public Domain Infringement Unit of the FBI and no Copyright Abuse
Section in the Department of Justice. Protecting the public domain is the work of
the government, but no one in government is specially charged with the task.
To summarize, federal copyright law provides strong protections for works
that fall within the scope of the Copyright Act, but the law only very weakly
safeguards the public’s interest in accessing and using works that are not copyrighted or copyrightable.
Id.
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in fair use rights would also pave the way for stronger public rights
in public domain works. In any case, a property analogy can
strengthen the public rights.
B. Making Fair Use an Easement Clarifies Default Outcomes
in Fair Use Considerations and Strengthens Public Benefits
The previous section showed the ways fair use already works
as, and is treated like, an easement. This section shows two ways
that treating fair use as an easement would alter current court
behavior. First, the easement rights granted to the public in the
form of fair use are independent of the exclusive rights of owners.
Fair use rights may therefore be asserted even outside of infringement accusations. Second, as a corollary of the first point, fair use
is a default right, and statutory interpretation should presume fair
use’s applicability unless explicitly exempted by legislation.
To the first point, the fair use easement created by § 107 does
not depend on the owner’s exclusive rights. The language used in
§ 107, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section[] 106[,]”196
creates a relation to, but not a dependence on, § 106. This
independence is reiterated in § 1201: “Nothing in this section shall
affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under this title.”197 If fair use is an
easement, the property interest applies to the property, and fair
uses are allowed in any context in relation to the property unless
another exception applies.
Easement holders have the right to use property within the
scope of their easement. Fair use, as an easement, should be
authorized in any context unless explicitly excepted.
Easement rights are independent of the property owner’s
rights, and easement holders may enjoin others from inhibiting
their rights.198 In a Wisconsin case, a business ejected union
protestors from its storefront.199 The business had “a nonexclusive
196. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
197. Id. § 1201(c)(1). Although this statement seems to make fair use operable despite

any indications to the contrary in § 1201, some courts have read this provision to only apply
to copyright actions arising under § 106 and not to those arising under § 1201. See Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
198. 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.17 (2018) (stating that an
easement owner can bring an action to enjoin interference with easement by third parties).
199. Roundy’s Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 674 F.3d 638, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2012).
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easement” to access the store.200 In analyzing the business’s rights
under the easement, the court held the store could “enjoin third
parties [that] unreasonably interfere” with its easement.201 However, the easement interference qualified as a nuisance and not a
trespass, since the business had a non-possessory interest and did
not have the right to exclude.202 Because the union protestors were
not unreasonably interfering with the business’s easement, and
because they had no exclusionary capability, the store’s expulsion
of the protestors was improper.203
As an easement, fair use is independent of the copyright
holder’s rights. Fair users should have a cause of action over any
parties interfering with their exercise of fair use rights, including
non–copyright holders involved in interference. As an easement,
fair use is subject to expanded actions for unreasonable interference, including when others exercise otherwise lawful rights.204
Additionally, there is room for expanded declaratory judgements
against copyright holders that unreasonably interfere with fair use
rights, as will be discussed in the following section.
On the second point, there are no laws that explicitly negate fair
use rights.205 Since the default fair use rights created by § 107 create
a property interest easement, they cannot be eliminated by implication. Elimination must be explicit. Although laws that negate
private property rights are subject to action for regulatory taking,206

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 643.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Just because the DMCA offers actions against those circumventing technological
protections does not imply that those protections are lawful. See Baseball Pub. Co. v. Bruton,
18 N.E.2d 362, 364 (Mass. 1938) (“The revocation of a license may constitute a breach of
contract, and give rise to an action for damages. But it is none the less effective to deprive
the licensee of all justification [for their licensed activity].”).
205. As an example, the DMCA has been interpreted to negate fair use defenses but not
held to explicitly do so. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (determining that fair use was not a defense to circumvention based on
statutory analysis of §§ 107 and 1201).
206. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying several
factors to evaluate a legislative taking: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant, (2) interference with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the
governmental action, specifically any physical invasion by government). The Penn case
noted that, in determining the character of the action, it is significant when “interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.” Id. Changes to copyright protection could likely fall under that
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copyright may be exempt. If copyright, like patents,207 are public
rights, then the public has granted rights to the owner and reserved
a fair use easement to itself. Congress has authority to alter the
scope of public rights and has done so in the past by removing
works from the public domain,208 altering the length of copyright
protection retroactively,209 and allowing patent rights to be adjudicated in Article I courts.210 If a future law explicitly negates or alters
fair use rights it will likely be litigated in part on these principles.
As an easement, fair use has a stronger role in copyright conflicts. Fair use rights are independent of owner’s rights and form a
default basis for the public to use copyrighted works.
C. As an Easement, Fair Use Cannot Be Eliminated
Fair use, as an easement, is a property right and cannot be
casually taken away. Property owners cannot completely block fair
use rights.211 This changes the default presumption about the role of
fair use in defenses tangentially related to copyright. In property
law, servient property holders cannot block easement access.
A salient feature of easements is the inability of the property
owner to terminate them.212 When property owners try to impede
lawful easement access, often with gates, courts step in to enjoin or
otherwise remedy the violation.213 For the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions, technological protections act as a gate
blocking fair use access.
Courts have invalidated all cases where a property owner
locks a gate and does not provide the easement holder a key. 214 A
category. There is no clear path for copyright owners, or fair-use easement owners, to object
to legislative changes in their rights.
207. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1373–75 (2018).
208. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 318 (2012) (holding Congress may grant copyright
protection to items previously in the public domain).
209. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003) (holding Congress may expand
copyright terms of both existing and future copyrights).
210. Oil States Energy, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–75 (allowing patent considerations in an IPR to
be adjudicated in an Article I court).
211. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592–93 (1994).
212. See, e.g., SOP, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Nat. Res., Div. of Parks & Outdoor Recreation,
310 P.3d 962, 967 (Alaska 2013).
213. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:28.
214. Id.; see also, e.g., Shors v. Branch, 720 P.2d 239, 243 (Mont. 1986) (concluding that
erecting locked gates to prevent easement holders from enjoying access to river beach was
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locked gate unreasonably interferes with the easement holder’s use
and enjoyment of the easement.215 For locked gates where the
owner furnishes a key, outcomes are fact dependent and courts
have been reluctant to craft clear rules, preferring to use a
reasonableness standard.216
One justification of locked gates is to protect the property
against trespassers.217 In one New York case,218 an unfinished street
led to the beach.219 The owners put up a locked gate to keep out the
public who often littered and disturbed the peace.220 Neighbors
who needed access to the throughway objected to the gate because
of their easement.221 New York’s appellate court held the gate was
lawful to keep out vandals and trespassers as long as the neighbors
were furnished a key.222

unreasonable); Sabella v. 927 Fifth Ave. Corp., 672 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1998) (directing
that servient owner provide easement holder key to locked gate, and holding that locking
gate at nights and Sundays without giving key constituted unreasonable interference);
Ferrara v. Moore, 318 S.W.3d 487, 493 (Tex. App. 2010), reh’g overruled, (Aug. 24, 2010), and
review denied, (Nov. 19, 2010) (finding that servient owner failed to provide easement holder
key to locked gate, thereby blocking access).
215. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:28.
216. Id.; see, e.g., Schluemer v. Elrod, 916 S.W.2d 371, 378–79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)
(considering circumstances in which locks should be placed on gates to roadway easement);
Carleton v. Dierks, 195 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); see also Calvert v. Griggs, 992
So. 2d 627, 633–34 (Miss. 2008) (remanding case to determine whether two proposed locked
gates unreasonably interfered with easement holder’s right of passage and whether such
gates were necessary for use of servient estate).
217. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 54, § 8:28; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garner, 896 S.W.2d
10, 15 (Ky. 1995) (permitting maintenance of locked gates to prevent vandalism and dumping
in wildlife area); Flaherty v. Muther, 17 A.3d 640, 658–59 (Me. 2011) (weighing “legitimate
desire to exclude trespassers” against “slight physical impediment” created by locked gate,
and finding that locked gate did not unreasonably interfere with use of beach access
easement); Mester v. Roman, 809 N.Y.S.2d 226, 227 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding locked gate to bar
trespassers and deter potential criminal activity); Wilson v. Palmer, 622 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884
(N.Y. 1995), judgment aff’d, 644 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that landowner can
maintain locked gate on foot path easement to prevent trespassing); Shingleton v. State, 133
S.E.2d 183, 188 (N.C. 1963) (holding that “the maintenance of a gate, even a locked gate,
would not necessarily be inconsistent” with dominant owner’s use of roadway easement
within a state wildlife area); Judy v. Kennedy, 728 S.E.2d 484, 487 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(upholding erection of locked gate to protect servient property from trespassers, but
requiring landowner to furnish easement holder current numeric code as well as two remote
opening devices).
218. Mester, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 226.
222. Id. at 227.
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Similar to locked gates in real property cases, Digital Rights
Management (DRM) controls are justified by preventing theft of
copyright—a trespass on copyright holder’s rights.223 To the extent
DRM blocks all legitimate easement access for fair use, it is
unlawful, just as the locked gate to keep out vandals could not fully
block legitimate neighbors. The form of key allowable to access fair
use rights may be debated.224 But easement law prevents complete
denial of access rights.
Courts balance the needs of the property owners against the
needs of and inconvenience to the easement holders. In a Pennsylvania case, an easement holder refused to accept keys and
removed a locked gate across an easement.225 The trial judge was
justified in requiring the easement holder to replace the gate.226
“The erection of a gate should not be restrained unless it is an
unreasonable interference with an easement, or completely denies
the rights of the user.”227 In this case, the gate was a minimal
inconvenience and provided protection for the owners and the
easement holders.228
Just because fair users have an easement does not mean they
can vandalize copyright. The voices warning that fair use rights
could be turned to infringing use are valid. But the reality of the
extreme does not absolve searching for a fair middle ground.
Copyright holders cannot completely block fair use. Neither can
fair use methodologies be allowed to destroy the value of copyrighted works.

223. See, e.g., Ryan Roemer, Locking Down Loose Bits: Trusted Computing, Digital Rights
Management, and the Fight for Copyright Control on Your Computer, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall
2003, at art. 8, p. 1 (“Conscious of the . . . widespread distribution of unauthorized
copyrighted works . . . the content industry is desperate for . . . protection. Most eyes are
currently turned to advances in ‘digital rights management’ (‘DRM’) technologies, which
offer an unprecedented level of control over digital content.”); see also C.J. Alice Chen &
Aaron Burstein, Foreword, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487, 487 (2003) (introduction to issue
covering “Symposium: The Law & Technology of Digital Rights Management”).
224. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 65–70 (2001) (proposing a mixed fair use infrastructure that
includes automatic fair use defaults and a key escrow system that provides would-be fair
users with the needed encryption keys to obtain access to protected works).
225. Matakitis v. Woodmansee, 667 A.2d 228, 232–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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DRM and the corresponding DMCA causes of action protect
copyrighted material from theft. The DMCA’s anti-circumvention
provisions outlaw tools that circumvent access protections on
copyrighted content.229 Such tools may enable fair uses of copyrighted works, but they are still prohibited. Although considered
by many commentators to be an extreme position on DMCA
rights,230 the court in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley231 stated
that fair use does not require “copying by the optimum method or
in the identical format of the original.”232 The appellants wanted to
digitally record on a computer and objected to any “‘horse and
buggy’ technique.”233 The court rejected their plea and suggested
229. See The Anti-circumvention Rules of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, STOEL RIVES LLP
(Mar. 1, 2002), https://www.stoel.com/the-anti-circumvention-rules-of-the-digital-millennium.
230. See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2008).
The persuasive force of Reimerdes is occasionally impaired by the heated—at
times, borderline intemperate—rhetoric of the court’s opinion. . . . The effect is to
make it difficult to tell whether, and to what extent, the court’s sweeping reading
of the DMCA’s liability provisions, and its denial that copyright’s fair use doctrine
was relevant to the reach of the DMCA, truly rest upon a careful construction of
the statute rather than on the judge’s manifest visceral dislike of the defendants.
. . . Reimerdes articulates a facially dubious construction of the
statutory text. . . .
. . . Although the Reimerdes court recognized that its interpretation of the
DMCA “le[ft] technologically unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use
of encrypted copyrighted works without the technical means of doing so,” it
declared that this problem was “a matter for Congress.” A court less animated by
hostility to the defendants in the case at bar might more readily have perceived
such an absurd consequence as evidence of error in its interpretation of the statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
231. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Note that
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley is the appellate court continuation of Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 342 (S.D.N.Y.), judgment entered, 111 F. Supp.
2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001).
232. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
233. Id. A fuller quotation demonstrates the extreme position that leaves many
commentators opposed to the logic of the case.
Appellants have provided no support for their premise that fair use of DVD
movies is constitutionally required to be made by copying the original work in its
original format. Their examples of the fair uses that they believe others will be
prevented from making all involve copying in a digital format those portions of a
DVD movie amenable to fair use, a copying that would enable the fair user to
manipulate the digitally copied portions. One example is that of a school child who
wishes to copy images from a DVD movie to insert into the student’s documentary
film. We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the
Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum
method or in the identical format of the original. Although the Appellants insisted
at oral argument that they should not be relegated to a “horse and buggy”
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using allowable tools to make a fair use recording by “pointing a
camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a monitor as it displays
the DVD movie.”234 While such analog fallback options currently
exist,235 what happens in a future world where there are no analog
content options?236

technique in making fair use of DVD movies, the DMCA does not impose even an
arguable limitation on the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair uses of
DVD movies, such as commenting on their content, quoting excerpts from their
screenplays, and even recording portions of the video images and sounds on film
or tape by pointing a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a monitor as it
displays the DVD movie. The fact that the resulting copy will not be as perfect or
as manipulable as a digital copy obtained by having direct access to the DVD
movie in its digital form, provides no basis for a claim of unconstitutional
limitation of fair use. A film critic making fair use of a movie by quoting selected
lines of dialogue has no constitutionally valid claim that the review (in print or on
television) would be technologically superior if the reviewer had not been
prevented from using a movie camera in the theater, nor has an art student a valid
constitutional claim to fair use of a painting by photographing it in a museum. Fair
use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in
order to copy it by the fair user’s preferred technique or in the format of
the original.
Id.
234. Id.
235. June M. Besek, Anti-circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan

Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 390 (2004) (“[T]echnological
protections are not yet as pervasive or as intrusive as critics have feared. A host of legal,
technological and market factors work together to counter digital lockup and provide a
safety valve to accommodate legitimate uses.”).
236. See Part C, “Reacting to a ‘Pay-Per-Use’ World,” in Nimmer’s “Riff on Fair Use”
for a relevant discussion. Riff on Fair Use, supra note 107, at 710.
If access to works via electronic or photo-optical means becomes the universal
norm, and if the only way that the pertinent network allows users to view any
instantiation of [a work] is through payment of a fee, then royalties to the
publisher . . . would become essentially mandatory. By the same token, if in
tomorrow’s world only antiquarians maintain phonographs and CD players, the
sole effective way to hear an old recording of music might be through the same
network service. To the extent that the service charged the same access fee for
early 1920s jazz recordings as for new recordings subject to copyright protection,
the effective result would be to convert public domain works into royaltygenerating items.
In short, depending on how the future unfolds, concern about fair use in the
digital environment could range from pointless to vital. The latter scenario
requires payment to gain access even to works that nominally lie in the public
domain, such as works from centuries past, even if the purpose of the access is for
one that the law favors, such as to quote a few sentences for scholarly purposes.
Under that scenario, the work itself is effectively placed under lock and key, and
the proprietor can charge simply for the initial act of access. Thus arises what one
senator calls “the specter of moving our Nation towards a ‘pay-per-use’ society.”
Id. at 713–14 (footnotes omitted).
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With fair use treated as an easement, copyright holders may not
fully eliminate fair use rights. According to the extreme logic of
Corley, any possible access to a work for fair use purposes is
enough.237 But reasonableness is the easement standard, and courts
balance the rights of the property holder with the rights of the
easement holder.238 Some DMCA cases have been cautious of
allowing the DMCA to go beyond the copyright protecting roots,239
but MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.240 may have
reversed that for at least the Ninth Circuit.241 MDY was not raising
any fair use issues, and the court did not directly address fair use
as a defense.242 But the court held that the anti-circumvention
provisions of § 1201(a) were independent of exclusive rights.243 In a
footnote, the court cited the Copyright Office’s view that “the fair

237. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
238. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 450 (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (citing cases

evaluating the reasonable use of the servient property); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY
(SERVITUDES) § 4.9 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“[T]he holder of the servient estate is entitled to
make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of
the servitude.”).
239. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[Section 1201] lays out broad categories of liability and broad exemptions from liability. It
also instructs the courts explicitly not to construe the anticircumvention provisions in ways
that would effectively repeal longstanding principles of copyright law.”).
240. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended
on denial of reh’g, (Feb. 17, 2011), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932,
2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011).
241. Armstrong, supra note 230, at 15 (2008) (“[T]wo federal courts of appeals refused
to apply the DMCA to prevent circumvention of access control mechanisms embedded in
durable goods.”). Armstrong discusses three cases: Chamberlain Grp., 381 F.3d at 1182
(holding that Chamberlain failed to prove a connection between Skylink’s accused
circumvention device and the protections that the copyright laws afford); Lexmark Int’l, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2004) (vacating injunction because
duplication of toner access program in printer did not violate the DMCA); and Storage Tech.
Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(rejecting a DMCA claim where software authenticated computer tapes used for backup and
a competitor duplicated functionality to provide support). A fourth case post-dating
Armstrong’s article is MDY Industries. MDY, 629 F.3d at 948–49. MDY rejected the
Chamberlain court’s requirement of a copyright infringement nexus and asserted § 1201
created a new anti-circumvention right. Id.
242. MDY, 629 F.3d at 950 n.12 (“[W]e need not and do not reach the relationship
between fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act and violations of § 1201. MDY has not
claimed that Glider use is a ‘fair use’ of WoW’s dynamic non-literal elements. Accordingly,
we too leave open the question whether fair use might serve as an affirmative defense to a
prima facie violation of § 1201.” (citations omitted)).
243. Id. at 946.
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use defense to traditional copyright infringement does not apply to
violations of § 1201(a)(1).”244
When easement access is unfairly blocked by property owners,
easement holders may obtain judicial relief in equity or damages.
For example, in a neighborhood dispute over an access path to a
lake, the owner unreasonably interfered with easement access.245
The Supreme Court of Montana upheld financial compensation for
lost use of the road, punitive damages for obstruction of the access
road, attorney’s fees, and court costs.246 The court also ordered the
land owner not to interfere with the easement owner’s repair of
the road.247
If fair use were treated as an easement, people unreasonably
denied their fair use rights could obtain injunctive relief and,
potentially, damages from the property owners even if the property
owners were only exercising their DMCA rights to implement
technology barriers. In the current world, there are alternate ways
of exercising fair use rights unimpeded by DRM restrictions. If that
changes, then DRM may unreasonably interfere with fair use rights.
Even when gates are reasonable, easement holders must receive a
key. If copyright holders unreasonably interfere with fair use and
don’t provide a key, it should be within a court’s power to grant
appropriate relief.
The fair use easement rights created for the public by the
Copyright Act are as valid as the exclusive rights created for the
owner. Even the text of § 1201 specifies that “[n]othing in this
section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.”248 The
meaning of this provision is key to interpreting the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions. The Reimerdes court espoused, “If Congress had meant the fair use defense to apply to such actions, it
would have said so.”249 It is just as valid to presume that if Congress
meant to exclude a fair use defense it would have said so.

244. See id. at 948 n.10 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 4 (Dec. 1998), https://www.
copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf).
245. Shors v. Branch, 720 P.2d 239, 243 (Mont. 1986).
246. Id. at 245–46.
247. Id. at 243.
248. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2018).
249. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Treating fair use as an easement would not necessarily eliminate all fair use–related objections to the DMCA. But it would draw
a line in the sand affirming that fair use could not be eliminated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fair uses are explicit exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive
rights and should be treated as an easement. The statute governing
fair use seems intended to convey rights in the copyright holders’
property that are not revocable and resemble an easement. If
copyright is considered property, fair use is an easement.
As an easement, fair use is a property right that must be considered when interpreting other statutes. Considering fair use an
easement thus supports a default presumption that fair use rights
apply. Courts should carefully evaluate all copyright laws with the
recognition that fair users and copyright owners have competing
property interests that must be balanced in an equitable way.
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